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Abstract
According to the standard view, when full competition prevails
in product, labour, and capital markets, positive or negative exter-
nal trade shocks may be accommodated by the migration of jobs be-
tween sectors; the negative impact on some households income of
lower nominal wages will be more than o¤set by lower prices of im-
ported nal goods. Unemployment, if any, will be temporary, unless
labour market rigidities prevent the necessary adjustment. We ar-
gue that trade shocks trigger a process of creative destruction that
necessarily causes distortions in the structure of productive capacity
and hence market disequilibria. Therefore, the structural change that
follows trade shocks can no longer be analysed within an equilibrium
framework. The transition following a shock may be characterized by
increasing imbalances, and create scope for policy intervention. The
model presented in this paper, which focuses on the time dimension
of production and market imbalances, allows clarifying the debate.
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1 Introduction
Developed economies exposed to competition from large emerging countries
such as China or India experience signicant increases of imports, relocation,
outsourcing and jobsdestruction in manufacturing sectors but also in value-
added services, which are becoming tradable. Emerging countries are exposed
to a symmetric shock: an increase of exports and FDI that implies deep
changes in industrial organisation and hurts the workers. International order
is deeply disturbed. This feeds a recurrent debate between the tenants of the
free market and those who plead for increasing protection.
According to the elementary theory of international trade, which rests
on the law of comparative advantages, an increase of exchanges between
countries is systematically benecial to all partners. Importing new goods
and services, even when these goods were previously domestically produced,
creates new opportunities and allows using productive resources in a dif-
ferent and more e¢ cient way. The loss of manufacturing jobs due to the
growing import penetration is generally o¤set by the job creation e¤ect of
growing exports. Penetrating international markets by exporting new goods
and services purchased by the consumers of more advanced countries allows
emerging countries to take advantage of larger productivity gains associated
with export sectors (Lucas 1993). International trade is thus a positive sum
game and cannot be considered as responsible of increasing unemployment,
waste of resources, and lower growth in any country.
However, old as well as more recent analyses demonstrated the possibility
of losses for some participants to the exchange. These losses would be essen-
tially due to di¤erences in productivity gains among countries, which result
in di¤erences in real income (Hicks 1953, Krugman 1985, Gomory and Bau-
mol 2000, Samuelson 2004). These models deal with the welfare e¤ects for a
country when domestic production is taken over by its trading partner, gen-
erally a less advanced country. Krugman (1985) argues that while technical
progress in the more advanced country is always benecial to both countries,
progress in the poorest country can, depending on circumstances, be harmful
for the more advanced one. Similarly, Gomory and Baumol (2000) show that
with increasing returns, and for su¢ ciently close levels of income in the two
countries, trade and relocation will harm the rich country. There are many
possible outcomes ranked in terms of welfare. Thus when a new outcome cor-
responding to a di¤erent distribution of industries among countries prevails,
there will be winners and losers.
This paper is not concerned by the nal welfare e¤ects of changing trad-
ing patterns. We focus on the complementary issue of the adjustment that
has to take place following the trade shock. One cannot deny that changes
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in international trade entail social and distributional costs. Trade can gen-
erate sizable benets only by restructuring economies that is the essence
of specialization according to comparative advantage and in the real world
restructuring does not happen without someone bearing costs. The ip side
of the gains from trade is the losses that have to be incurred by adversely af-
fected workers and enterprises(. . . ). Simply put: no pain, no gain. It makes
little sense to pretend otherwise(Rodrik, 1998 p. 5). Thus it is not enough
to focus on the distribution of gains between countries or within countries
(among di¤erent skills, or between wages and prots). In the following we will
argue forcefully restructuring is an intrinsic feature of globalization and re-
location processes; in fact, increasing openness is a form of structural change
and hence analytically equivalent to technical progress; as such, it entails
the destruction of the existing productive capacity (and of the corresponding
jobs), and the construction of something new to replace it. Thus, distortions
are not an impediment to a smooth transition to the new equilibrium, as
argued by the tenants of free market paradigm; they are an intrinsic and
unavoidable feature of the structural change process. We push Rodriks ar-
gument even farther, by arguing that this process of restructuring needs not
to be successful: the ex ante benets from increased openness may ex post
fail to materialise, if something goes wrong with the co-ordination process.
Thus, the process of restructuring needs not to be successful.
Our medium-run analysis on the conditions for the success of the tran-
sition will be, inevitably, concerned with short-term e¤ects on employment
and wages and hence with policy conclusions. In fact, we will conclude that
the viability of the transition, and the recovery of coordination crucially
hinge upon the right mix of institutional and policy factors, notably in what
concerns access to credit.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 contrasting
the standard neoclassical framework with an evolutionary one, is an attempt
to identify which domestic distortions matter in a country facing a change
in conditions of international competition. Sections 3 and 4 then propose
a model that allows both reproducing neoclassical results and introducing
an analytical framework suited to deal with structural change. By using
the model and simulating out-of-equilibrium paths, section 5 shows how real
domestic distortions inuence the evolution of the economy, and hence why
and how international trade matters. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Which Domestic Distortions Matter?
Changes in international trade will result in mutual gains if there is no ob-
stacle to prevent the redistribution of productive resources among sectors
that allows the convergence toward the full employment equilibrium. Thus,
the low-wage country will be able to use an a­ uent amount of labour in the
production of new goods. The high-wage country will be able to increase
productivity, by reallocating its labour force in the value-added services and
high-tech sectors, where it has a comparative advantage. It will also be able
to shift some workers from manufacturing to service jobs even if the latter
require lower skill and hence involve lower nominal wages (compensated by
the decrease of prices of imported goods).
Within the standard analytical framework these considerations lead to fo-
cus on the role played by wage adjustments and distortions associated with
them. For the gains from trade and relocation to occur it is essential that
no domestic distortion prevents the necessary adjustment (i.e. the conver-
gence towards the full employment equilibrium). Changes in fundamentals
(technology and preferences) must be accommodated by relative prices (in
particular wages). In this case, relocation only corresponds to a better allo-
cation of resources at the international level without harmful consequences
on employment. Increasing imports will be matched by increasing exports.
The only obstacle that would prevent from capturing the gains from trade
is the downward rigidity of wages paid to low-skilled workers. On the one
hand, this stickiness would cause unemployment of low-skilled workers. On
the other hand, the ows of international trade can be distorted. As Brecher
(1974) put it, if minimum wage applies in the high-wage and capital abun-
dant country, the labour intensive sector both res too many workers and
sets free a too large amount of capital. As a consequence, both exports of
capital-intensive goods and imports of labour-intensive goods grow beyond
what is considered their optimal size. This view is coherent with policies
that focus on supply conditions with the objectives of increasing competitive
advantages for an economy with respect to its external competitors. Re-
ducing wage di¤erentials, improving labour market exibility, reducing taxes
seem to be the only viable policies aimed at avoiding domestic distortions
and their e¤ects on the structure of international trade, thus favouring full
employment. This view is partial, focusing on the functioning of the labour
market and ignoring the systemic nature of the process of change and its
time dimension. There is no reference to the creation of resources. Price
and wage distortions, when occurring, only a¤ect the rate of utilisation of
productive resources (labour), and result in their under-utilisation. This is
the reason why policy makers have o correct these distortions by reducing
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direct and indirect labour costs.
This paper takes the view that distortions are intrinsically built in struc-
tural change processes, as the one stirred by globalisation. As a matter
of fact, economies hurt by changes in international trade are concerned
with other distortions that those which are created by the wage stickiness.
Changes in international trade go hand-to-hand with the breaking-up in the
pre-existing industrial and spatial structure of productive capacity, which re-
sults in unavoidable disequilibria between supply and demand of nal goods,
all along the transition towards the new adapted structure of the economy.
Thus, the supply side, and in particular investment, become crucial for an
analysis of the transition to a new steady state. As the problem does not
consist in the reallocation of existing resources but in the creation of a new
productive capacity, it is pointless (and may be harmful) to try to bypass
the transition and the associate turbulence by eliminating the price distor-
tions. Policy should rather accompany the process of change, progressively
removing or softening the constraint faced by the economy.
Indeed, as a consequence of trade liberalization, imports are substituted
for goods locally produced, while local exporters have not automatically the
necessary supply capacity to expand. Thus, liberalization seems to result
in labour temporarily going from low-productivity protected sectors to zero-
productivity unemployment (Stiglitz and Charlton 2006 p. 26). This is
true both for developing and developed countries. This leads to a reduction
of income, and hence in the demand for nal output, which will be more
or less pronounced whether according to the level of social insurances. At
the opposite of the conclusion of standard analysis, a high level of social
protection can help to avoid global damages associated with a cumulative
process of depression.
In this perspective, international trade as well as foreign direct invest-
ment matter, but not only with respect to initial endowments or existing
externalities. In fact, for an open economy, balanced growth results from
harmonisation of external and internal demand with the productive capac-
ity. Trade and openness may be very important factors both in increasing
the long-run growth potential, and in smoothing uctuations due to country
specic shocks; but this positive role is fullled only if the economy has in-
ternal resources the reference is mainly to productive capacity, but also to
a su¢ cient level of revenues to match the increase in demand and to keep
the balance that is necessary to successfully complete a transition process.
Thus, openness and the emergence of new countries do not create di¢ cul-
ties per se. Market disequilibria and distortions in the productive capacity
that necessarily emerge both in the emerging and developed countries call
for local co-ordination of economic activities, which cannot amount to re-
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ducing production costs in the hope of re-establishing competitiveness. Co-
ordination should consist in creating the conditions for rms to deal with
these real distortions, which are the unavoidable consequence of structural
change.
Summing-up, what is at stake is not to prevent real domestic distortions
that are inherent to the process of change, but how to smooth them thanks
to appropriate policies. Thus we need a model that puts into light these
distortions and allows identifying the required remedies.
3 The Benchmark Model
We consider a model with one country and two goods. This model does
not directly address issues related to growth and trade relationships, but
it is an attempt to analyze how an external shock due to an increase in
competitiveness of a foreign country a¤ect the composition of goods produced
in both countries, and hence global performance.
Our economy is comprised of N rms, that are divided in the produc-
tion of a basic (b) and an advanced (a) good. This production is sold to a
representative domestic household, who supplies labour inelastically, and to
a foreign household. The utility of the domestic household also includes an
imported good, and is written as follows:
max u = Xa X
(1 )
b Z
1 
s:t: R = paXa + pbXb + qZ
where pa; pb and q are the prices of the advanced, basic and imported
good, respectively, and R are total revenues of the household. The foreign
household demands Wj (j = a; b), that we treat as exogenous. As a conse-
quence, the value of total demand, for the two goods is given by:
paXa = R +Wa
(1)
pbXb = (1  )R +Wb
Demand for the imported good, qZ = (1   )R; does not concern us. The
 and  (with  +   N) rms in the two sectors compete in quantities,
à la Cournot. We further assume that workers can work in any of the two
sectors (i.e., that wa = wb = w), and that Aj is the number of workers per
unit produced in each sector j = a; b (we assume constant returns to scale).
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The standard, solution of the problem gives
xa =
(  1) (R +Wa)
2Aaw
; pa =
wAa
  1 ;  =
(R +Wa)
2
(2a)
xb =
(   1) ((1  )R +Wb)
2Abw
; pb =
wAb
   1 ; b =
(1  )R +Wb
2
(2b)
where of course we assume symmetry (xa = Xa=, and xb = Xb=):
To close the model, we nally assume that prots are distributed to the
domestic household, so that household income R is equivalent to the revenues
from sales of the two goods produced at home:
R = paXa + pbXb (3)
From eqs. 3 and 1 we can obtain
R = R + (1  )R +W = W
1  
where W  Wa + Wb: The total revenues of the system are a function of
external wealth. As a consequence, from eq. 1 we can dene the value of
production in the two sectors as
a = paXa =

1  W +Wa =


1  Wb +
 + (1  )
1   Wa

b = pbXb =
(1  )
1   W +Wb =

1  
1   Wb +
(1  )
1   Wa

Notice that external demand of both goods enters into the two demand
curves. This happens through the revenues e¤ect
3.1 Equilibrium
The equilibrium relies on two conditions.
 The rst is the equilibrium in the labour market, requiring that the
quantity of labour L; inelastically supplied, be equal to labour demand:
L = AbXb + AaXa =
Abb
pb
+
Aaa
pa
(4)
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 The second equilibrium condition is the equality of prots across sec-
tors, which implies that no rm will have incentive to switch. Rewriting
eqs. 2 as
xa =
  1
2Aaw
a; pa =
wAa
  1 ;  =
a
2
(5a)
xb =
   1
2Abw
b; pb =
wAb
   1 ; b =
b
2
; (5b)
the condition a = b yields
a
2
=
b
2
(6)
Putting together eqs. 4 and 6, using the price equations of eq. 5 and the
fact that  = N   , equilibrium is dened by the solution to the following
system:
p
a

=
p
b
N    (7a)
wL =
(N     1)b
N    +
(  1)a

; (7b)
where the unknowns are  and w: The system can be solved recursively to
obtain  and w
 = N
p
ap
b +
p
a
: (8a)
w =
(b + a)(N   1)
p
ba   2ba
LN
p
ba
(8b)
It is interesting to notice that only external demand and the number
of rms help determine  and w. Because we dene equilibrium through
the equality of prots in the two sectors, the technology parameters do not
a¤ect the distribution of rms, nor the wage. Well see in the next section
that these parameters become crucial when analyzing disequilibrium paths.
Notice also that, as (b + a)   2
p
ba > 0; the wage is always positive.
On the other hand, equation 8a gives conditions on the parameter for the
equilibrium to be meaningful
1 <  = N
p
ap
b +
p
a
< N:
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The second inequality is certainly veried, while the rst implies, with some
manipulation,
 > 1 () Wa
W
>
1  (1 + (N   1)2)
(1 + (N   1)2) (1  ) :
If external demand for the advanced sector is not large enough, the equilib-
rium number of rms may be lower than 1.
3.2 Reaction to Shocks
Using equations 8a and 8b, and the fact that d
dWj
= @
@b
@b
@Wj
+ @
@a
@a
@Wj
; we can
write
d
dWb
=
p
bp
a
  
p
ap
b
(1  )
 
N
2
p
b+
p
a
2
(1 )
!
d
dWa
=
p
bp
a
(1   + ) 
p
ap
b
(   )
 
N
2
p
b+
p
a
2
(1 )
!
We are now able to prove a number of propositions:
Proposition 1 d
dWa
> 0 and d
dWb
< 0: An increase of external demand for a
sector yields a larger equilibrium number of rms in that sector.
Proof. d
dWa
> 0 : p
bp
a
(1   + ) 
p
ap
b
(1  )
!
> 0
()
b (1   + )  a(1  ) > 0
Substituting:
((1  )Wb +  (1  )Wa) (1   + ) 
 (   ) (Wb + (1   (1  ))Wa)
= Wb(1  ) > 0
d
dWb
< 0 :
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 p
bp
a
  
p
ap
b
(1  )
!
< 0
()
(b   a(1  )) < 0
Substituting:
((1  )Wb +  (1  )Wa)   
 (1  ) (Wb + (1   (1  ))Wa)
= (   1)Wa < 0
Proposition 2 da
dWa
> 0 and da
dWb
> 0: An increase in external demand for
any sector yields a larger equilibrium prot.
Proof. Equilibrium prot can be dened, from eqs. 6 and 8a:
a(= b) =
a
2
=
 p
b +
p
a
2
N2
As a and j are positively a¤ected by bothWa andWb; we conclude that
any increase in external demand increases equilibrium prots
The reaction of wages to external demand shocks is harder to sign, because
in fact it depends on the size of the reallocation of workers between the two
sectors.
@w
@Wa
=
p
ba(N   1)  ( (1  ) a + (1   + )b)
LN
p
ba(1  )
@w
@Wb
=
p
ba(N   1)  ((1  ) a + b)
LN
p
ba(1  )
Once studied the steady state properties of our model, we can introduce
the dynamic elements that essentially involve capacity building and expecta-
tions, in the spirit of Amendola and Ga¤ard (1998). The model will extend
to a two sector Cournot economy the paper by Saraceno (2004).
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4 Adding a Time Structure
Section 2 argued that trade shocks are analytically equivalent to productivity
shocks in that they trigger a structural change with the associated distortions
that have to be managed for the transition to be successful. To model struc-
tural change in a production economy, four ingredients are required: First,
Production takes time, and is often characterized by complementarity rather
than substitutability in the factors. This is captured analytically by assuming
a Leontief production function that uses labour inputted at di¤erent times.
Second, agents have bounded rationality, especially when facing complex en-
vironments. Thus, expectations are adaptive. Third, no variable may move
instantaneously. As in temporary equilibrium models (Hicks, 1939; Benassy,
1982), prices only adjust between periods; ex-ante disequilibria within the pe-
riod are eliminated by rationing and stock accumulation. Fourth, agents are
constrained, in their transactions, by nancial availability. This sort of credit
or cash-in-advance constraint emerges because markets open sequentially.
4.1 The Sequence
Each period begins with some state variables inherited from the previous
one. First, labour embedded in production processes (as will be clear below);
then, stocks that result from past disequilibria. And nally, the prices and
wages.
Within the period we introduce a sequence that helps in dening the time
structure of the model.
 Prices and wages change in response to market disequilibria, even if we
do not let them clear markets.
 Firms may also change sector, based on realized prots in the previous
period.
 Then, after agents form inter and intra period expectations, and ac-
cordingly desired demands and supplies. In particular rms form a
demand for labour, and a demand for nancial means (the wage fund)
 The rst market that opens is the nancial market, in which demand
for external funds may or may not be satised. Financial constraints
cause a rescaling of labour demand.
 Total labour employed is determined once the second market, the labour
market opens. Then wages are paid, and production is carried over.
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Households adjust their desired demands based on the actual wage
perceived.
 Finally, the product market opens, and as in the other markets, the
short side rule applies.
The next sections will detail this sequence.
4.2 Wage Dynamics
Wages change early in the period, following previous disequilibria:
wt = wt 1

1 + !
Ldt 1   Lst 1
Lst 1

Thus ! is an indicator of price exibility; as the equation claries, this has
nothing to do with market clearing behaviour.
4.3 Firm Dynamics
Firms may change sector of activity. This happens when prots di¤er:
t = t 1

1 + 
a;t 1   b;t 1
a;t 1 + b;t 1
Ia

where Ia is an indicator function taking a value of 1 only if n 2 (1; N). Firms
changing sector still use the built productive capacity to carry on production
in the original sector, but invest in the other sector.
4.4 Expectations
Previous work (Amendola and Ga¤ard, 1998; Saraceno, 2004) has explored
the role of expectations in this type of models. We could show rather robustly
that when interacting with sunk costs and irreversibilities in the production
process, adaptive expectations play an important role. We also argued at
length that in a complex environment, when collecting complete information
may be impossible or extremely costly, agents may nd it more convenient
to follow an adaptive rule. Long term expectations, that drive investment
decisions, are instead more independent of contingent conditions.
Coherently with these arguments, in this paper we make di¤erent as-
sumptions regarding assumptions: short term or intraperiod expectations
are backward looking. Firms decide how much they wish to produce in the
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current period, based on their expectation of current demand, that in turn
is determined by the expected level of employment. The latter is determined
as an average between past employment and its "normal" value
Let = Lt 1 + (1  )L
where L = L is the steady state level of employment.
If we are not at full employment, we have to write expected revenues as
the sum of paid wages, plus distributed prots
Ret = wtL
e
t +t 1 +H
h
t 1
where  = a + b: Notice that we add an additional term (Hh): if house-
holds had been left with unspent money balances in the previous period,
these balances will concur to form current revenues. Expected demand then
becomes
xea;t =
t 1   1
2t 1Aawt
(Ret +Wa;t)
xeb;t =
t 1   1
2t 1Abwt
((1  )Ret +Wb;t)
It is important to remark that agents take into account the fact that rms
having switched sector do not possess productive capacity (otherwise, t and
t would have been used instead of t 1 and t 1); we assume in other words
that agents use all the information they possess, in order to be as close as
possibly allowed, in this context, to rational expectations. The amount rms
will actually attempt to produce, depends also on stocks of goods left from
disequilibria from past periods, that the rm is able to bring back on the
market.
sej;t = x
e
j;t   oj;t 1
Finally, interperiod expectations, are important to determine how much
to invest, i.e. how many workers to hire today to put in place tomorrows
production. We assume that these decisions are not inuenced by short term
movements:
Let+1 = L
 = L
4.5 Production and Labour Demand
The two elements of complementarity and time-to-build are introduced by
assuming that the production function takes the form of a Leontief function
with dated labour input
sj;t = min[jlj;t 1; jlj;t]
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where j = a; b denotes the sector. Thus, dated and current labour concur
in xed proportions to the determination of production; this formulation
is equivalent at assuming production to be undertaken with capital built
in the previous period, that fully depreciates. Thus, current production is
constrained among other things by past "investment". If rms dont possess
the appropriate amount of capital/dated labour, they will not be able to
produce as much as they wish. As a consequence, rms will only demand
the labour they really need:
lj;t =
1
j
min
 
sej;t; jlj;t 1

:
Labour demand is hence given by
Ldt = L
d
a;t + L
d
b;t
=

sea;t+1
a
+ la;t

t +

seb;t+1
b
+ lb;t

t
4.6 The Financial Sector: Demand and Supply for Ex-
ternal Funds
Demand for external funds comes from whatever of the wage bill is not cov-
ered by past prots. Money demand may then be written as the di¤erence
between the wage fund and internal resources.
F dt;j = wtL
d
t;j   (St 1;j +Hft 1;j   t 1;j) (9)
where S is the value of past sales in the two sectors, and Hf denotes involun-
tary monetary hoardings by rms. Equation 9 embeds the credit constraint:
the rm system needs additional funds for whatever of the wage pool it can-
not nance out of internal resources. As prots are distributed to households
at the end of the period, they are not available for rms.
The behavior of the supply side in the nancial market is not explicitly
modeled. In fact, we adopt a very stylized representation, in which the
supply of external funds can be interpreted as credit made available by the
nancial sector. We simply assume that the supply of credit by nancial
sector is adversely a¤ected by turbulent times (proxied in our model by the
variability of prots), and by the strength of the economy, proxied by the
unemployment rate):
F st;j = max
 
0; F dt;j   (1  )(V ar[j] +  ut 1)

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where  2 [0; 1], and V ar[j] is the past variance of j: In words, we assume
that the nancial sector will react to increasing variability of prots, or to
deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, by tightening the ow of credit.
Larger values of the parameter  will capture a more accommodating credit
market, while credit constraints will be more important at low levels of : At
the steady state, with no unemployment and constant prots, money demand
F dj will be accommodated.
The credit market is the rst to open. This modeling trick allows to
implicitly introduce a nancial constraint. If rms are unable to access to
the needed external funds, then they wont be able to carry on their planned
investment. The parameter ; that we leave exogenous, is the crucial variable
to help understand the e¤ect of credit rationing on the path followed by the
economy.
4.7 The Labour Market
If F st < F
d
t ; then rms will not be able to hire as many workers as they desire.
Total labour demand is then equal to
L^dt =
F st + (St 1 +H
f
t 1   t 1)
wt
(hats denote constrained quantities). In the simulations below we will assume
that rms rst reduce investment, i.e. labour demand for the construction
phase. If funds are still not enough, then current production has to be cur-
tailed as well.
The second market to open is the labour market. If L > L^dt we have
unemployment, otherwise a human resource constraint will occur. E¤ective
employment will thus be determined by the short side of the market
L > L^dt ) Lt = L^dt
L < L^dt ) Lt = L
Rationing will a¤ect all rms in the two sectors proportionally, i.e. L^j;t =
Ldj;t
L
L^dt
:1
1Notice that an issue of strategic behaviour could arise here: knowing the rationing
rule, rms could modify their behaviour in order to obtain, once rationed, their optimal
quantity. We overlook this issue, as it presupposes perfect knowledge by the rm of the
behaviour of its competitors in their own as well as in the other sector.
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4.8 Production and the Goods Market
Once the labour market is closed, wages are paid, and production is carried
on. The last market to open is the goods market. Supply depends on what
happened previously in the sequence:
xsj;t = min[jlj;t 1; jlj;t] + oj;t 1
pa;t = wt

  1Aa pb;t = wt

   1Ab
Notice that lj;t embeds all the constraints that may have arisen along the
sequence. On the demand side, actual employment determines the resources,
and total demand
Rt = Ltwt +t 1 +Hht 1
Xda;t = Rt +Wa;t
Xdb;t = (1  )Rt +Wb;t
The short side rule applies to the goods market as well, so that we have
Xdj;t > X
s
j;t ) Hhj;t = pj;t
 
Xdj;t  Xsj;t

Xsj;t > X
d
j;t ) Oj;t = Xsj;t  Xdj;t
The equation for Hh implicitly assumes that external demand Wj is sat-
ised in priority. The period ends at this point. The state variables that
link it to the other periods are the stocks H and O; the wage level w; and
the capacity (the quantity of labour stocked to carry on production in the
following period.
The next section will investigate, by means of simulations, how the tran-
sition for an economy takes place after a shock. In particular, we will focus
on the role of credit in facilitating the transition between di¤erent equilibria.
5 Out-of-equilibrium Paths
The technology parameter values we chose show a basic sector in which very
few workers are needed in the construction phase, while a substantial amount
of labour concurs to the production phase. On the contrary, the advanced
sector is capital intensive, in the sense that most of the labour has to be ap-
plied in the construction phase. We further chose the technology parameters
in such a way that overall steady state productivity (Xj=Lj; j = a; b) is larger
16
in the advanced sector2. We investigated the path followed by the economy
following a negative shock at time t = 10 in the basic sector (specically,
Wb;10 = 0:8Wb;9). The new steady state will then be characterized by lower
wages and prots, and an increase of the number of rms in the advanced
sector.
We consider the three institutional variables that a¤ect the transition
towards the new equilibrium, notably the degree of wage stickiness !; the
speed of rm migration from less protable to more protable sectors , and
the degree of accommodation of the nancial sector, :
We rst began with a low rate of rm migration ( = 0:05), and we
simulated three series of scenarios that correspond to di¤erent and alternative
degree of reaction of wages to labour market disequilibria: xed (! = 0),
sticky (! = 0:05) and exible wages (! = 0:5). With xed wages (gures 1
and 2) the economy will converge towards a sort of Keynesian equilibrium
characterized by a constant rate of unemployment. Because wages do not fall,
unemployment is not reabsorbed. This has an e¤ect on aggregate demand,
and supply in both sectors decreases. What is interesting is that whether the
nancial sector accommodates investment or not does not make a di¤erence,
as we can observe by comparing gure 1 with gure 2.
If we introduce a moderate reactivity of wages (! = 0:05; gures 3 and 4),
the system converges towards equilibrium. After the initial drop in prots and
production, due to the negative shock on employment, the decrease in wages
allows unemployment to be reabsorbed, while aggregate demand increases
again. This gives the rms the resources they need to carry on production
and investment, and to converge to the new steady state. Not surprisingly
then, even in this case there are no major di¤erences related to the intensity
of the credit constraint. In fact, the transition is nanced out of internal
funds.
The existence of a credit constraint becomes crucial when wages are very
sensitive to labour market disequilibria. Figures 5 and 6 show the dynamics
corresponding to ! = 0:5: In this case, and with a tight credit constraint, the
sharp reduction in wages following the initial unemployment a¤ects aggregate
demand. Even as unemployment initially drops, the wage fund is reduced,
and rms face decreasing demand and prots. As a consequence investment
will be constrained, and the resulting evolution of the system is not viable
(gure 5). If nancial markets accommodate the investment needs of rms,
as in gure 6, then the lack of internal resources can be compensated by
external money, and the economy converges towards a new steady state with
2Specically, we have b = 1:6; a = 0:8; b = 0:2; a = 10: Overall productivity in
the two sectors is then Xb=Lb = 0:17 and Xa=La = 0:74
17
full employment.
If rms change sector more easily (i.e., with  = 0:1), the tendency of the
system to instability naturally increases. In fact, as rm migration means
investment e¤ort without a corresponding output (productive capacity has
to be built beforehand), if too many rms migrate at the same time, the dis-
ruption in productive capacity will feed back in lower employment, demand
and again in production, in a vicious circle. Then, when wages are xed (see
gure 7 where  = 0. The equivalent with  = 1 is similar and available upon
request) the fall in aggregate demand will be limited, and the system will be
able to recover coordination (albeit in a pseudo equilibrium with persistent
unemployment)3. But as soon as we introduce wage variability, even moder-
ate (gure 8), the migration of rms will disrupt the productive capacity of
the economy, and the fall of wages will a¤ect aggregate demand, revenues and
the nancing capacities of rms. As a consequence, only an accommodating
nancial sector will allow investment to be nanced, and the new equilibrium
to be reached (gure 9).
This set of results shows that the natural tendency of the system to
converge to the new equilibrium may be hampered by excessive variations
in wages and or by too fast migration between sectors; these may trigger,
via aggregate demand e¤ects, an important drop in the investment capac-
ity of rms; In turn, if this lack of resources is not compensated by the
nancial sector, the insu¢ cient investment disrupts the productive capac-
ity of the economy, and triggers a cumulative explosive process. Therefore,
re-establishing the coordination between investment and consumption and
reabsorbing unemployment requires an accommodating credit policy.
We also simulated the case of a positive shock on the demand for basic
goods, a shock that typically hits developing countries. In this case, the
responsiveness of wages to labour market disequilibria does not seem to play
a major role whereas the viability of the transition will systematically require
easy access to credit. Figures 10 and 11 prove this point for rigid wages
(! = 0: The other gures are available upon request).
5.1 Robustness
The time series results reported above need to be generalized to make sure
that the results do not depend on the particular set of parameters used for the
3This simulation extends to a disequilibrium framework Keynes argument for wage
rigidity as a means to avoid cumulative aggregate demand - aggregate supply downward
spiraling (see the chapter on wages of Keynes, 1936). For a detailed discussion of this
argument refer to Amendola, Ga¤ard and Saraceno (2004) and Saraceno (2004)
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simulations. To this end we thoroughly investigated the relevant parameter
space to assess whether our results are robust or not.
We randomly drew (500 times) the three parameters  2 [0; 0:2] ! 2
[0; 0:5] and  2 [0; 1] to lie between the extreme values of the simulations
above; for each of these draws we ran the dynamic system for 100 periods,
always perturbing it with a negative external demand shock (Wb =  0:2).
We then recorded, along with the parameter values, the nal level of unem-
ployment and other variables of interest (variance of prots along the run,
etc). The result of this Monte Carlo experiment strongly conrms the con-
clusions we drew from the analysis of time series. Figure 12 shows a plot of
unemployment for the complete sample (500 draws). It shows that many
runs are not viable, as they are clustered at a near 100% level. The linear
trend lines show that the non viable processes are more frequent for high
levels of ! and ; thus conrming that excessive exibility has a destabilizing
e¤ect on the transition process. (we also reported total exibility, proxied
by the sum +!). As for the e¤ects of nancial constraints, the Monte Carlo
experiment shows that higher levels of  -a more accommodating nancial
sector- are associated with lower unemployment, thus also conrming the
ndings of out time series analysis.
We made this impressionist statement more rigorous by building a binary
regression model on the dataset created by the experiment, i.e. associating a
1 to each viable process (dened as a process that has a long run unemploy-
ment rate of less than 30%) and a 0 otherwise. According to this denition,
around 25% of the processes (127 out of 500) were viable. The results of
the probit regression are reported in table 1, that once again conrms our
ndings. While it is well known that the coe¢ cients do not represent the
marginal e¤ect of the regressors, their sign gives the direction of change.
Thus, a positive coe¢ cient for  means that more accommodating nancial
markets make the viability of processes more probable, while the negative
coe¢ cients of ! and  imply that excessive exibility in the labour market or
in the migration of rms reduce the probability. By looking at gure 13 we
can nally notice that the pattern is clearer for ! than for : the distribution
of wage exibility parameters for viable processes is clearly skewed, while for
rm migration the pattern is less clear.
While the negative role of exibility in what concerns the viability of
transition emerges robustly from our analysis, excessive rigidity may also be
a problem. Figure 14 shows the same plots as gure 12, for the subsample
of 127 viable processes. As can be seen, to larger ! now correspond lower
unemployment, while  is still positively associated with unemployment. The
latter e¤ect being smaller, increasing total exibility within the subset of vi-
able processes, reduces unemployment. The subset of viable processes also
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Dependant Variable: V iable = 1
Variable Coeff:
(stderr)
p-value
Const 0:448
(0:24)
0:0624
 1:46
(0:26)
0:000
!  6:56
(0:70)
0:000
  5:70
(1:24)
0:000
pseudo R2 = 0:34
nobs.: 500 (dep = 1 : 127)
Table 1: Probit regression. Dep. var. is 1 if long run unemployment rate is
lower than 30%, 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses. p-values
are also reported.
higlights an interesting property of nancial constraints, that show a binary
behaviour: either they guarantee viability (in combination with other para-
meters), or they dont. And once viability is assured, there is no e¤ect of 
on the performance of the economy. A regression analysis on unemployment
within the subset of viable processes conrms our ndings. Table 2 shows
that  is not signicant in explaining unemployment, and that ! and  in-
teract in a nonlinear way. If we plot the coe¢ cients for ! and  of table 2,
assuming in each case that the other variable takes its median value, we ob-
tain gure 15. The gure shows that for very low values of ! unemployment
is large, while for values larger than around 0.1 it uctuates around zero. On
the contrary, increasing the speed of migration of rms has a negative e¤ect
on unemployment even within the sample of viable processes.
To sum up, the disequilibrium transitions that we analyzed may apply
to both advanced and emerging economies; the former are hit by increas-
ing imports of basic goods, and the latter take advantage of low production
costs and export increasing quantities of basic goods. Our simulations show
that appropriate behaviours and policies should keep access to credit easy,
in order to sustain the investment capacity of rms and to help to prevent
excessive disturbances in the structure of productive capacity that hamper
the growth process. We further show that excessive exibility in wage adjust-
ment and in the speed of migration between sectors have a negative e¤ect on
viability. Nevertheless, once the particular combination of these three factors
guarantees the overall success of disequilibrium transitions, we observe that
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Dependant Variable: unemp
Variable Coe¤. Variable Coe¤. Variable Coe¤.
C 3:57
(3:07)
 142:9
(2:65)
!  571:9
( 2:86)
!  173:2
( 10:2)
2  1515:29
( 2:68)
(!)3  330211
( 3:00)
!2 1968:1
(6:96)
4 48855
(2:61)
(!)6  7:98E08
( 2:66)
!3  6739:9
( 5:75)
7  4768016
( 2:32)
!23 251560
(3:07)
!5 33305
(4:85)
  1:62
( 0:87)
!6  38087
( 4:62)
2 1:536
(0:825)
R2 = 0:678 Nobs.: 127
Table 2: Regression results. Dependent variable is nal unemployment. T-
stats in parentheses.
excessive wage rigidity prevents the adjustment and hence delivers excessive
unemployment, and that nancial constraints do not play a major role in ex-
plaining unemployment. We concluded that the role of nancial constraints
is binary (on/o¤): either they make the process viable, or they dont. But
once the process is viable, the performance of the economy is independent
from availability of nancial means.
6 Concluding Remarks
Changes in the geographical distribution of economic activities, which are
in the nature of the growth process, may go hand-to-hand with internal dis-
tortions that emerge from an inevitable and powerful structural change and
cannot be eliminated by simply liberalizing trade and allowing the economy
to be as near as possible to a state of perfect competition. While public poli-
cies that would only focus on costs conditions and hence on competitiveness
of territories could amplify these distortions, which are mistakenly attributed
to international trade, gradual adjustments in an environment characterized
by incomplete information and irreversibility (here dened as the existence
of a time to build) should allow the hurt country re-establishing full employ-
ment and capturing productivity gains associated with specialization.
The di¤erent paths generated by the model, corresponding to di¤erent
value of key parameters, conrm that the main issue lies not in the dramatic
21
changes in the imports and exports ows, that simply reveal changes in com-
parative advantages; rather, the problem lies in the way that internal (and
unavoidable) distortions are dealt with. Loose monetary and exchange rate
policies appear as the means required for reducing these distortions. But, the
architecture of the nancial system must also be considered insofar it is es-
sential for determining transmission mechanisms. As a matter of fact, credit
availability depends on the banks(and shareholders) behaviour, which will
be di¤erent according to the sectorsconguration, and which is a¤ected by
monetary policy in a complex way. Our purpose, here, is not to explore these
transmission mechanisms, but simply to underline their extreme importance
for the evolution of economies that may su¤er or take advantage of markets
openness at the world level.
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Figure 12: Montecarlo Simulation. Plot of nal unemployment after the
transition that follows a shock (Wb =  0:2) against randomly drawn values
for  2 [0; 1];  2 [0; 0:2] and ! 2 [0; 0:5]
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Figure 14: Montecarlo Experiment. The gure reads like gure 12, but only
viable runs are reported
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Figure 15: Plot of regression coe¢ cients from table 2. Unemployment as a
function of ! assuming that  equals its median value  = 0:08 (black dashed
line); unemployment as a function of  assuming that ! equals its median
value ! = 0:12 (black dashed line).
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